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According to the literature on the ‘new politics of the welfare state’, party politics plays a 
minor role in welfare policy outputs today. In this article, we ask what the degree of 
politicisation is below the level of government. Focusing on two specific policy areas – 
pension reform and anti-poverty policy – and both substantive and procedural aspects of 
politicisation in the case of Norway, we identify party policies and map intra-party decision-
making prior to the 2005 general election. We first conclude that neither policy area seemed 
to be strongly politicised, but nonetheless, there were limits to the ‘de-politicisation’ of 
welfare policy even in a consensual state like Norway. Hence, we show – or confirm – that 
counter-forces might exist between and within political parties in advanced industrial 
societies, yet to varying degrees across welfare policy fields. 
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According to the growing literature on the ‘new politics of the welfare state’, party politics 
plays a minor role in welfare policy outputs today. It is widely argued that the field of welfare 
policy is weakly politicised, owing to the various demographic and economic challenges of 
the modern welfare state. In this article, we shed new light on the topic by focusing on extra-
parliamentary party politics in one particular country: Norway. We set out to investigate the 
extent of the politicisation of policy positions and internal policy-making during the early 
2000s, rather than measuring changes over time.  
 
We start by briefly summarising the scholarly literature on the politics of welfare policy, and 
conclude that what happens below the macro-level of the state is still a largely moot point. 
The question is whether the alleged low degree of party politicisation in this field materialises 
between and within the parties as well. Next, we examine the concept of politicisation and 
how it can be understood and measured at lower levels of politics. After that, we present and 
discuss our general research design: an in-depth case study of Norwegian parties within the 
fields of pension reform and anti-poverty policy. We argue that Norway is an interesting case 
from a comparative perspective, not least as one of the major historical examples of extensive 
welfare states in Europe. Then, we describe and evaluate our data and research methods. The 
following empirical analysis first maps party policy positions and differences, and secondly, 
internal policy-making processes. In the final sections, we discuss our findings and their 
implications for future research. 
 
2. POLITICAL PARTIES AND ‘THE NEW POLITICS OF THE WELFARE 
STATE’  
 
In the literature on recent welfare policy reforms, Paul Pierson’s work is often the centre of 
attention. Usually summarised as the ‘new politics’ thesis, Pierson (1994 and 1998) has 
convincingly argued that politicians have been caught in the crossfire between increasing 
expectations of welfare services among the voters and an unavoidable need to curb increasing 
expenditure arising from demographic and economic developments. As a consequence, the 
politics of social policy today centres on the renegotiation, restructuring, and modernisation 
of the welfare state, rather than on its dismantling through extreme retrenchment (Pierson 
2001). The argument also implies that a broad political consensus about welfare state reform 
has emerged, in the centre, between the status quo and radical retrenchment, among the 
defenders of the welfare state and the advocates of dismantling social protection (Pierson 
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1998: 553ff; see also Schludi 2005). Thus, the class-related partisan politics – emphasised by 
the traditional ‘power resources approach’ (Korpi 1983) – is less important for welfare 
policy-making than it used to be. Moreover, the partisan arena is not the only, or necessarily 
the most important, domain in which reform policy is developed today: the corporatist arena 
plays an equally important or larger role, according to the ‘new politics’ thesis (Pierson 1998: 
556). Contrary to the general ‘partisan theory of policy-making’ (Keman 2006), it is argued 
that the role of parties as policymakers tends to be modest, and consequently, that the 
characteristics of government (composition and ideology) are not significant for public 
(reform) policy in this area.  
 
Other studies, however, vary in their support for the new politics thesis (Green-Pedersen and 
Haverland 2002). Kittel and Obinger (2003) have found a weakening of partisan effects in a 
study of the development of social expenditure in 21 OECD countries. Based on an analysis 
of party positions and welfare policy implementation in Austria, Germany and the 
Netherlands, Seeleib-Kaiser et al. (2008) have similarly concluded that Social Democratic 
aims and objectives, have moved closer to those of Christian Democrats, pushing the welfare 
state in a Liberal Communitarian direction. Others, however, nuance or question ‘the new 
politics thesis’. Some studies have found that traditional partisan politics remains central to 
welfare policy-making in an era of austerity, in line with the ‘power resources approach’. 
Based on an analysis of ‘welfare state regress’ in 18 countries, Korpi and Palme (2003) 
concluded that class-based partisan politics remains significant for retrenchment (see also 
Allan and Scruggs 2004). Likewise, Finseraas and Vernby (2011) found that partisan 
ideology has influenced changes in welfare state generosity in 18 OECD countries. Huber 
and Stephens (2001) provided qualitative and quantitative evidence regarding the importance 
of partisanship for the historical development of welfare states. They showed that Social 
Democratic and Christian Democratic cabinets tended to be significantly associated with an 
expansion of welfare activity in the 1960s, and to some extent in the 1970s. The relationship 
weakened in the 1980s and 1990s, but they also concluded that the Left and Centre-left 
opposed and mitigated retrenchment in the 1990s.  
 
Others have argued that parties matter, but in different ways than those predicted by the 
‘power resource approach’. Ross (2000) found that ‘the Left’, in some notable cases, has 
been more effective in bruising the welfare state than ‘the Right’. Finally, some studies have 
looked at the conditions for welfare state reforms. General party system configurations – like 
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the existence of strong market-liberal parties, the saliency of economic vs. socio-cultural 
issues, or bloc politics vs. party systems with pivotal centre parties – may affect policy-
making (e.g. Green-Pedersen 2001; Kitschelt 2001). A few have also maintained that the 
relationship between political parties and trade unions matters (e.g. Anderson 2001). In other 
words, it is argued that partisanship remains significant in respect of public welfare policy, 
and the jury is still partly out as to whether other party (system) features also impact on the 
content and direction of public welfare policy. 
 
In this article we do not aim to address this debate per se, but focus instead on extra-
parliamentary party politics in light of the implications of the ‘new politics thesis’, both as 
regards policy positions/distances and the process of internal policy-making today. One issue 
is what parties do when adopting public policy in government; another is how they compete 
for votes by offering policy choices and how welfare reform policy is developed (or not) 
outside public office, independent of bureaucracy. Autonomous parties may react differently 
to similar general circumstances, and are capable of acting in response to the context. Factors 
like variation in primary goals (i.e. votes, office and policy (Strøm and Müller 1999)) might 
make parties differ, and thus matter, even when the external pressure for homogeneity is 
strong. Moreover, membership-based parties might need to anchor major policy decisions in 
their party organisations before negotiating in public office. Thus, the question to be 
addressed is: what is the degree of politicisation of welfare policy beyond the level of 
government? It is not given that the party level is weakly politicised, even if public policy is: 
possible counter forces to pressure for limited ‘politicisation’ might be found between and 
within the parties themselves in advanced industrial societies. Moreover, if parties are 
actually distinct, policy wise, at this point in time, and include their membership 
organisations in the making of general welfare reform policies, this would shed light on the 
above-mentioned findings at the macro level. Indeed, the studies supporting the ‘power 
resources approach’ do themselves make a significant or perhaps even a strong degree of 
politicisation at the party level more likely to exist. 
 
To answer our research question (as far as the Norwegian case is concerned), one needs to 
identify individual parties’ policy positions (from left to right) on major welfare issues, and to 
assess the extent of policy differences between them (party distance). In addition, one has to 
map intra-party decision-making on these policy issues before any negotiations take place 
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between the parties. Below, the concept of politicised vs. depoliticised issues is further 
discussed and specified for empirical research. 
 
3. THE POLITICISATION OF WELFARE PARTY POLICY: A FRAMEWORK 
FOR ANALYSIS  
 
‘Politicisation’ deals with the process through which certain issues become objects of public 
contention and debate, and a politicised issue is, thus, by definition, a publicly contested one. 
Hence, if welfare policy-making were left to corporatist arrangements or to technocrats in the 
central administration, it would be considered a virtually depoliticised area. However, the 
literature on welfare state reforms does not imply that the field of welfare policy completely 
lacks ‘politics’, but that weak politicisation involves the limited impact of political parties on 
public policy. In what follows, we ask what the logic of the ‘new politics’ would imply 
beyond the macro level, in the extra-parliamentary party sphere. Even though we do not 
measure policy change over time, descriptions of the current ‘status quo’ public policy and 
traditional party policy differences will indirectly serve as key points of reference.  
 
First, we would expect policy differences between the parties to be small. Major parties will 
advocate a moderate ‘middle position’ between the status quo and radical retrenchment, and 
not their traditional ideological positions on welfare reform issues. Moreover, party elites are 
likely to pay limited attention to reform issues in election manifestos and campaigns, as this 
is not an issue likely to mobilise voters. According to Pierson (1994; 1998), party competition 
over welfare policy is now about blame avoidance rather than credit seeking. Welfare 
cutbacks are necessary, but unpopular, and parties want to evade responsibility. As such, the 
welfare state literature largely echoes recent party literature: according to the so-called 
‘cartelisation thesis’ globalisation has led to the convergence of parties’ economic policies 
(Blyth and Katz 2005). The result is, according to Katz and Mair (1995; 2009), the formation 
of party cartels among established parties. Together they limit the extent of party competition 
and vulnerability to public opinion, by downsizing voter expectations and excluding certain 
issues and political solutions from the public agenda (Blyth and Katz 2005). Unpopular 
welfare state reforms could be one such issue. That said, however, new (post-war) parties 
might exist in opposition to established parties on welfare policy (reform) issues, increasing 
the level of politicisation somewhat. 
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Second, if party elites are compelled to promote austerity on welfare issues due to structural 
constraints, they might well hesitate from involving the party organisation in policy-making, 
even though intra-party democracy formally exists. Such involvement could provide 
legitimacy to reform policies, as was the case in the era of the typical mass membership party 
(Duverger [1954] 1972), but could also hinder the party leadership in making unpopular 
decisions. Thus, in line with the de-emphasis of manifestos, party elites might prefer to 
control welfare policy-making completely – or simply to avoid it until after election day. In 
this sense, ‘depoliticised’ means that involvement in major policy decisions is limited to the 
party elite. This proposition is also in line with the general cartel party thesis, which states 
that representatives in public office gain power at the expense of the extra-parliamentary 




Hence, we see that the degree of politicisation both has a substantive and a process-oriented, 
or procedural, aspect. Whereas the first concerns both the individual party and the party 
system, the second is an intra-party dimension, including formal structures and actors. To 
study them empirically, we must both look at the parties’ policy statements and the processes 
through which policies are developed. Table 1 specifies possible aspects of the weak vs. 
strong politicisation continuum along each dimension. For the sake of simplicity, and to 
highlight the implications of the ‘new politics thesis’, only indicators of weak politicisation 
are included in the table. 
 
Table 1. Indicators of weak politicisation of party policies and policy-making in welfare 
reform issues  
 
                                                 
1
 The procedural aspect is hitherto a largely neglected aspect of politicisation at the party level in the welfare 
state reform literature. Yet it is worth noting that Loxbo (2013) recently concluded that the leaders of the 
Swedish Social Democratic Party exercised less control over internal party debate and decision-making on 




It is, of course, hard to tell exactly what the threshold for weak politicisation is, and the 
overall degree of politicisation will be assessed as a tentative, qualitative judgement. 
However, the various criteria will be further specified in due course. Regarding ‘traditional 
positions in welfare issues’, we assume, in line with the power resources thesis (Korpi 1983; 
Korpi and Palme 2003), that right-of-centre parties have typically criticised an extensive, 
redistributive welfare state, whereas left-of-centre parties have advocated this model (see also 
Budge et al. 2001). 
 
4. GENERAL RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
A general aim of this study is to link two separate strands of literature together: the literature 
on welfare state reforms and the literature on political parties. This attempt at breaking new 
ground calls for an in-depth study and we have, therefore, selected one country and one party 
system to explore as a start: Norway. To map the entire system of political parties and 
possible variation across policy areas, we concentrate on policies and policy-making in the 
early 2000s. The theoretically-grounded expectations to be explored empirically are 
formulated accordingly. 
Weak substantive politicisation (individual 
party and inter-party) 
Weak procedural politicisation (intra-party) 
 The policy differences between the 
major parties are marginal as regards 
the need for welfare state reform; they 
neither prefer status quo nor radical 
retrenchment 
 
 The parties’ welfare (reform) policies 
are not marked by traditional 
ideological positions along the left-
right axis 
 
 New significant (post-war) parties in 
opposition to a possible agreement 
between established parties in welfare 
policy (reform) issues do not exist 
 
 Welfare (reform) issues do not 
constitute significant parts of election 
manifestos and campaigns 
 
 Individual party activists and local 
party branches are not involved in 
intra-party discussions of welfare 
policy (reform) issues 
 
 Their views are not systematically 
channelled to the party leadership 
through a representative or direct 
intra-party democracy  
 
 ‘Internal’ interest groups, such as 
trade unionists in the case of leftist 
parties, are not involved in intra-party 
welfare (reform) policy-making 
 
 Such policies are instead developed 
by the party leadership and its 
professional staff – or exclusively by 





We cannot generalise about other countries, but Norway is one of the major historical 
examples of extensive and universal welfare states, and thus an interesting case from a 
comparative perspective (Esping-Andersen 1990; Kuhnle 1983). Like other advanced 
industrial societies, the Norwegian state is facing a substantial increase in the proportion of 
the elderly compared to the proportion of the population in the work force. Even though the 
development of public welfare was based on a broad degree of political consensus in 
Norway, there was also significant party disagreement – for example, on the degree of 
universalism and the balance between redistribution and social insurance in the National 
Insurance System (Hatland 1992; Kuhnle 1983). 
 
A possible objection is that Norway is particularly affluent due to its oil resources, and thus 
in a very different economic situation than most advanced welfare states. However, the oil 
fortune is not unlimited and it is widely argued that it must be shared with future generations. 
From a long-term perspective, Norway is faced with the same need to adapt its pension 
system to challenges created by the aging of the population. Also, this case study provides an 
opportunity to examine the role of parties in a multi-party system, including both a new left-
wing party and a new right-wing party. As far as policy-making is concerned, Norwegian 
parties are historical examples of extra-parliamentary party organisations that have, in fact, 
developed policy – not just political principles and overall goals (Heidar and Saglie 2002). 
On the other hand, the Norwegian political system has – like other Nordic systems – often 
been described as ‘consensual’, due, among other things, to parliamentary standing 
committees and commissions of inquiry on major policy issues including both government 
and opposition parties (Arter 1999: 200ff). 
 
Empirically, the study is limited to two specific policy fields. We study pension reform as a 
major example of an area where the external pressure for reform has been strong in all 
welfare states. If a low degree of party politicisation characterises the field of welfare policy, 
this is very likely to include pension reforms. One reason is the economic need for radical 
reform; another is the technical complexity of the matter. As Anderson (2001: 1085) points 
out, many citizens were simply unable to follow discussions on pension reform in Sweden. 
 
If traditional ideology still generates party differences as regards the choice of pension model, 
different positions can also be expected concerning both the need for cuts and the system 
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architecture in Norway. In particular, right-of-centre parties will be inclined to cut 
expenditure and promote an insurance-based model, whereas left-of-centre parties will be 
more reluctant to accept the need for cuts and will advocate a redistributive system. The 
centrist position on the pension issue – which weak politicisation would imply – would be to 
enforce cuts in spending, but not radical ones, even if they are thought to be necessary. 
 
To get a rough idea of whether a possible tendency of weak politicisation applies to welfare 
policies in general or is more limited, we contrast pension policy with anti-poverty policy. 
Some sectors may be less conducive than public pensions to the kind of strategic positioning 
Pierson describes. Clasen (2005: 188) argues that ‘welfare states as a whole are ill-suited for 
comparisons of reform dynamics since actors and institutional settings vary across welfare 
state programmes within a country’ (see also Anderson 2001). For example, the perceived 
need for budget cuts might differ across policy fields. Measures against poverty weigh less 
heavily on public budgets, and fighting poverty might well imply a need to spend more 
money. 
 
Moreover, old-age pensions are universal, whereas only a small – and politically marginal – 
group is affected by anti-poverty measures. The conditions for highlighting party differences 
in elections may therefore be more favourable in the latter field. The pressure for less intra-
party participation may also be weaker in the area of anti-poverty policy than in the area of 
pension reform. Whereas pension reform is a technically complex matter, the grassroots level 
of a party may more easily relate to many other welfare issues, including anti-poverty 
policies. To quote a former British Social Security Minister, ‘in the welfare field, the punter 
is the expert’ (Bochel and Defty 2007b: 305). 
 
The political Left and the political Right have not been clearly polarised on anti-poverty 
policies in Norway, but structural explanations of poverty and universal welfare measures are 
traditionally most strongly associated with the Left. If the parties’ anti-poverty policies are 
characterised by weak politicisation, we would primarily expect leftist parties today to place 
more emphasis on individual responsibility to improve living conditions (the ‘workfare 
principle’) and selective welfare measures, at the expense of structural explanations and 
universalism (Villadsen 2007). 
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Hence, we do not only aim to compare different parties, but also to explore whether there are 
differences as regards party policy positions/differences and the intra-party policy-making 
process between different policy fields. In this way, we hope to respond to a widespread 
objection against the ‘new politics’ literature, namely that (too) little attention has been paid 
to differences between policy sectors (Green-Pedersen and Haverland 2002). 
 
5.  DATA AND METHODS 
 
As indicated above, we do not aim to measure the extent of change over time, but whether 
parties approach the contemporary pattern of policy and policy-making as the ‘new politics’ 
thesis would suggest. 
 
Our units of analysis are the seven largest Norwegian parties, with (almost) continous 
representation in Parliament since the 1970s. The aim has been to map the parties’ policies 
and policy-making before the 2005 general elections. Norway was then governed by a centre-
right minority coalition, including the Conservative Party, the Christian People’s Party and 
the Liberal Party. The centre-left opposition (which formed a coalition government after the 
2005 election) consisted of the Centre Party, the Labour Party and the Socialist Left Party. 
The final opposition party was the Progress Party. The Socialist Left Party and the Progress 
Party were the only parties without any previous government experience before the 2005 
elections. They were founded in the 1960s and 1970s on the left and the right, respectively, in 
opposition to the establishment. However, although all parties are important to the party 
system as a whole, most attention will be paid to the Conservative and Labour positions, as 
these are the traditional antagonists along the right-left axis. 
 
Data from the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) are often used to map policy positions, and 
an example of a key issue that is used to measure left-right positions is welfare state 
expansion vs. limitation (see Budge et al. 2001). The data set has also been used in studies of 
how the welfare policies of Nordic political parties have developed since the 1970s (Nygård 
2006; see details below). However, while useful for comparisons over time and across 
countries, the broad categories used in these data cannot be used to describe differences 
between welfare policy fields. To map both substantive and procedural party politicisation of 
pension and anti-poverty policies, we instead chose a qualitative design. 
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We used two types of sources and data in this study: statements from various party 
documents and interviews with key informants. Moreover, one of the authors observed the 
2005 national party congresses of all seven parties,
2
 which provided valuable background 
information on both aspects. Newspaper articles and the speeches of party leaders were used 
for illustrative purposes. 
 
The most authoritative accounts of parties’ welfare policy positions are the relevant parts of 
the party programmes or manifestos. Norwegian parties adopt new programmes before each 
general election, which are held every four years. These are detailed policy documents, and 
thus more comprehensive than their counterparts in most other Western European countries 
(Green-Pedersen 2007). Norway has no constitutional provision for the early dissolution of 
Parliament, and this predictability facilitates comprehensive manifesto development, often 
starting a couple of years prior to the election. 
 
The Labour government appointed a Pension Commission with representatives from all 
parties to discuss and propose pension reforms in 2001. As party policies in 2005 could be – 
and turned out to be – strongly affected by party positions in this Commission, a few 
government reports and white papers on pension reform have been included in our analysis. 
Moreover, to deepen our knowledge of the final policy statements, we have followed the 
entire path to the party programme by examining the manifesto drafts, proposed changes (put 
forward before the congress by local or regional branches, parliamentarians, youth 
organisations, the executive committee etc., or at the congress by the editorial committee), in 
addition to the final product. Manifestos have been supplemented with congress resolutions, 
when parties chose to include only short statements on pension reform in their manifestos. 
Our interviews (described below) provide supplementary information, and also indicate that 
other documents were relevant in a few cases – like resolutions adopted by the party’s 
national council.
3
 As regards the content of parties’ campaign efforts, we rely on previous 
research on the role of welfare issues in the 2005 election campaign (Karlsen 2009). 
 
                                                 
2
  Centre Party, Kristiansand 10–13 March; Socialist Left Party, Kristiansand 31 March–3 April; Labour 
Party, Oslo 7–10 April; Liberal Party, Molde 15–17 April; Christian People’s Party, Tønsberg 21–24 
April; Conservative Party, Oslo 6–8 May; Progress Party, Ålesund 20–22 May. 
3
  Due to space constraints, the titles of the numerous party documents are not listed here. 
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A broad range of sources – and ‘process tracing’ – has also been used to analyse ‘procedural 
politicisation’ (cf. Table 1 above). Following the development of policy documents from the 
Pension Commission, via manifesto drafts to the final statements, was, in itself, useful. The 
parties’ annual reports also provide valuable procedural information, and have thus been used 
as well. However, most importantly, we carried out qualitative interviews with the secretaries 
of the committees that prepared the 2005–2009 Manifestos in all the seven parties. These 
were all political advisers at national party headquarters, selected on the basis of their formal 
position, and interviewed as representatives of the party as a whole. Because the Socialist 
Left Party and the Progress Party dissented from the majority recommendations of the 
Pension Commission, we also interviewed these two parties’ representatives on the 
Commission.
4
 The elite interviews were semi-structured and based on a fairly detailed, fixed 
list of open-ended questions, with room for individual follow-up questions when relevant. 
Summaries of conducted interviews were sent to, and approved by, all interviewees. 
 
As for data analysis, beyond summarising organisational facts, we have classified manifest 
policy statements into pre-defined categories after reading documents and interview reports. 
The content, however, has not been coded. Reflecting our multiple source approach, major 
tendencies are summarised verbally as detailed descriptions, with document and interview 
references and a few quotes to illustrate typical statements. The empirical analysis is divided 
into two main parts: an analysis of substantive and procedural politicisation, i.e. policy 
positions and ways of policy-making. Due to the nature of the policy-making process, the 
descriptions are first made chronologically: we do not apply the analytical dimensions and 
indicators listed in Table 1 explicitly until the final discussion of findings. Put differently: the 
study is theory-informed, but not designed as a rigorous test, as we have also, in a more 
explorative way, aimed to describe policy-making as a process. 
 
6.  SUBSTANTIVE POLITICISATION: MAPPING OF POLICY POSITIONS 
AND DISTANCE  
 
                                                 
4
  Two of the authors interviewed Political Adviser, Tor Brostigen (Socialist Left Party, 9.11.05); Deputy 
Leader, Henriette Westhrin (Socialist Left Party, 13.12.05); Political Adviser, Snorre Wikstrøm (Labour 
Party, 15.11.05), Assistant General Secretary, Oddvar Igland (Centre Party, 9.12.05); Political Adviser, 
Alf Rose Sørgaarden (Christian People’s Party, 30.11.05); Political Adviser, Geir Olsen (Liberal Party, 
8.12.05); former Political Adviser, Egil Dahl (Conservative Party, 17.2.06); Political Adviser, Ronny 
Røste (Progress Party, 14.2.06); and Political Adviser, Inger Marie Ytterhorn (Progress Party, 7.3.06). 
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In this section we map party positions and differences in the 2005 election manifestos and 
other policy documents, within our two selected fields of policy. Do party positions vary 
significantly, along traditional ideological lines, or not? The ‘new politics’ thesis predicts 
marginal welfare policy differences between the parties, at least in the case of pension 
reform. A study of welfare policy positions in the Nordic countries from 1970 to the early 
2000s, based on data from the MRG Project, indicates that Norwegian parties still differ from 
each other. The Left remains the foremost defender of a strong welfare state, whereas the 
Right, to a greater extent, promotes market-type solutions (Nygård 2006). Is this also the case 
for particular policy sectors? We first examine pension policies, and second, policies for 
combating poverty. In each case, we start by presenting the backdrop to the parties’ policy 
positions in 2005: the public policies and the agenda of public debate in Norway at that time. 
 
6.1.  Party Positions and Differences: Pension Reform 
 
The old-age pension system is the cornerstone of the Norwegian National Insurance System, 
which consists of a first tier of universal flat-rate benefits and a second tier of earnings-
related benefits. The System is financed according to the pay-as-you-go principle, and the 
future financial position of the scheme has been a concern of successive governments for the 
last three decades. Recently, the Norwegian debate on pension reform has centred around two 
main issues, both echoing the literature on retrenchment. First, financial sustainability: is 
there a need for a reform that limits future expenditure? Second, the distribution of benefits: 
should the system move towards a more insurance-based model, or maintain its rather strong 
redistributive profile (Pedersen 2005)? 
 
We begin the assessment of party positions in 2005 by looking at the Pension Commission’s 
report (NOU 2004:1), as this became the basis for all the parties’ manifesto statements on 
pensions. The Commission was appointed to ‘clarify the main objectives of and principles for 
the overall pension system’ (NOU 2004:1, p. 38). All parties represented in Parliament 
accepted the invitation to participate in the Commission, along with some independent 
experts. 
 
When the Commission’s report was published in January 2004, all parties except the Progress 
Party concluded that it was necessary to reduce future pension expenditure, and all parties 
except the Socialist Left and Progress Party supported a closer link between contributions and 
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benefits. The Socialist Left Party developed an alternative proposition, which also reduced 
future expenditure, but with a stronger element of redistribution. The Progress Party, on the 
other hand, proposed a universal flat-rate benefit system – which the party’s manifestos have 
promoted since 1975 (Opsahl 2007: 12–13). Thus, old parties tended to agree, whereas both 
new parties dissented from the majority position to a greater or lesser extent. The rightist 
Progress Party’s somewhat surprising position relates to the fact that the party advocates 
spending a larger share of the oil revenues than other parties do. 
 
Most parties presented their pension reform policies in detail in their manifestos or in a 
comprehensive resolution adopted by the party congress. However, as the conventions took 
place before the negotiations on a parliamentary settlement were completed in May 2005, the 
policy statements in the manifestos or congress resolutions were made relatively vague. As 
for the content, the five parties that agreed on the need for reform in the Pension Commission 
maintained this position in their manifestos and resolutions, but traditional party positions 
regarding redistribution were to a greater extent recognisable here. The Conservatives 
strongly advocated reforms to make the system more economically sustainable and a closer 
connection between individual contributions and the size of the pension,
5
 whereas the 
Pension Commission’s report was much disputed within the Labour Party. Critics within the 
Party argued that the Commission had proposed a model that worked to the disadvantage of 
low-income groups (see Pedersen 2009: 136–7). The party debate revolved around two 
conflicting principles – redistribution vs. rewarding work effort – and both principles were 




The internal debate became even more heated in the Socialist Left Party, and led the party to 
reject a cost-cutting reform: 
 
The Socialist Left Party disagrees with the view that there is a need for cuts in the National 
Insurance System, because nobody knows what the situation will be in ten or twenty years. 
The Socialist Left Party proposes that Parliament should review the financial situation of the 
                                                 
5
  ‘Nye muligheter. Høyres stortingsvalgprogram 2005–2009’. (‘New opportunities. The Conservative 
Party’s manifesto 2005-2009’) Adopted by the Conservative Party’s congress, Oslo, 6–8.5 2005, 102. 
However, it could also be argued that the Conservatives had toned down the previous manifesto’s 
emphasis on market-based elements in the pension system (see the Conservative Party’s manifesto for 
2001–2005, section 7.20, downloaded from www.hoyre.no). 
6
  ‘Ny solidaritet. Arbeiderpartiets program 2005–2009’.(‘New solidarity. The Labour Party’s manifesto 
2005-2009’). Adopted by the Labour Party’s congress, Oslo, 7–10.4 2005, 41–43. 
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National Insurance System, for example, every tenth year. The alternative to future cuts may 
be an increase in social insurance contributions.
7 
 
In May 2005 all major Norwegian parties, except for the Progress Party and the Socialist Left 
Party, formed a parliamentary settlement on pension reform (Pedersen 2009). In this way, 
pension reform was excluded as an issue from the forthcoming election campaign by the old 
parties. However, the two new parties which opted out of the settlement used their 2005 party 
congresses to raise pensions as a campaign issue before the general election in September 
2005. The Progress Party Deputy Leader, Siv Jensen, described the recent parliamentary 
settlement in this way: 
 
Through the pension settlement, the government parties, the Centre Party and the Labour 
Party are taking pensions away from people. Now it has been agreed that pensioners will be 




Likewise, the Socialist Left Party leader, Kristin Halvorsen, stated that ‘if the government 
parties and the parliamentary majority enforce unjust cuts at this point, we promise a replay 
after the election!’
9
 However, she eventually had to consider the trade-off between 
campaigning against pension reform and the party’s credibility as a partner in a government 
coalition with two pro-reform parties. The ‘replay’ was cancelled, and neither the Socialist 
Left Party nor the Progress Party actually used pensions as a campaign issue (Karlsen 2009). 
 
6.2.  Party Positions and Differences: Anti-Poverty 
 
Norwegian local authorities provide social assistance to persons in need of urgent income 
support, and to those who are not entitled to benefits from the National Insurance System. 
Social assistance is means-tested, and the level of support varies between municipalities. 
National standardisation of benefits has been a recurring issue, but two other issues within the 
poverty field were equally central during the early 2000s: the balance between work and 
benefits and the choice between selective and universal measures. In Norway, as in many 
                                                 
7
  ‘Et rettferdig pensjonssystem’ (A fair pension system’)... Resolution adopted by the Socialist Left Party’s 
congress, Kristiansand, 31.3–3.4 2005. 
8
  Main points from Siv Jensen’s speech to the Progress Party’s congress, Ålesund, 20–22.5.2005, reported 
at www.frp.no. See also VG Nett, 20.5.2005 
9
  Kristin Halvorsen’s speech to the Socialist Left Party’s congress, Kristiansand, 31.3–3.4.2005. 
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other countries, demands on welfare recipients have become more widespread in recent years. 
The question is to what extent work and activity should be a condition for the payment of 
benefits – so-called ‘workfare’ (Lødemel and Trickey 2001). 
 
What were the Norwegian parties’ policy positions on these issues in 2005? All parties paid 
significant attention to poverty in their manifestos, but under different headings. Some parties 
emphasised the concept of poverty, whereas others discussed the same policy measures in 
terms of other principles, e.g. redistribution or the standard of living. For example, ‘nobody 
should live in poverty’ was one of the headlines in the Socialist Left Party manifesto, while 
the Conservative Party manifesto only used the word ‘poverty’ when describing global 
challenges.
10
 Regardless of the parties’ use of concepts, we focus on the extent to which 
traditional patterns appeared regarding views on the causes of poverty and on the choice of 
selective vs. universal measures. 
 
First, it should be noted that there was broad agreement – among both old and new parties – 
on emphasising that employment is the most important way to combat poverty − perhaps 
most clearly articulated by the Conservatives and the Labour Party. True, our interviews 
show that the Conservative Party spoke for the more liberal regulation of temporary 
employment, in order to ease access to the labour market, whereas the Labour Party 
introduced ‘welfare contracts’ (between clients and the social security office) to encourage 
social assistance recipients to find employment.
11
 But in both cases, the poor were supposed 
to assume responsibility for improving the situation themselves. Thus, the Old Left did not 
articulate the traditional structural view on poverty, and the new Socialist Left clearly did not 
oppose this cross-party agreement. 
 
However, both leftist parties still preferred universal measures. The centre–right Bondevik II 
government, in contrast, emphasised the need for ‘targeted’ (i.e. selective) social policy 
measures, to reach those who needed it most. Yet our interviews indicated some 
                                                 
10
  ‘Ulike mennesker. Like muligheter. SVs arbeidsprogram 2005–2009’. (‘Different individuals. Equal 
opportunities. The Socialist Left Party’s manifesto 2005–2009’). Adopted by the Socialist Left Party’s 
congress, Kristiansand, 31.3–3.4 2005, p.7; ‘Nye muligheter. Høyres stortingsvalgprogram 2005–2009’. 
(‘New opportunities. The Conservative Party’s manifesto 2005–2009’). Adopted by the Conservative 
Party’s congress, Oslo, 6–8.5 2005. 
11
  Interviews with former Political Adviser, Egil Dahl, 17.2.06; and Political Adviser, Snorre Wikstrøm, 
15.11.05. 
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disagreement among and within the coalition parties. In the Conservative Party, targeting was 
said to be in line with century-old Conservative policies, while there was some unease about 
this development in the Christian People’s Party – where policies used to be anchored in 
universalism.
12
 The Liberal Party argued strongly in favour of targeting. The following 
statement from the party leader’s speech to the Liberal Party congress illustrates this point:  
 
Cheap rhetoric about tax cuts for the rich has never helped those who are left behind. Nor 
have general welfare measures for everybody. The Liberal Party’s targeted measures for those 
who need public support most, will do so...The Liberal Party will give priority to those who 
need it most, instead of spreading new welfare benefits thinly. For the Liberal Party, the aim 
is not to improve conditions for the entire working class, but to take care of individuals who 




In accordance with this emphasis on targeting, the Liberals proposed, among other things, 
means-testing child allowances. On the other hand, the Liberals were the only party to 
endorse the idea of basic income.
14
 This is a universal benefit, and the concept ‘income’ 
implies that the benefits must be above a minimal level. When it came to concrete measures 
against poverty, the Liberal manifesto and website, as well as our interview, indicated that the 
party was at odds with itself. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that poverty made up not only a significant part of all manifestos, 
but was also a campaign issue of three parties in 2005: the Socialist Left, the Liberals, and the 
Christian People’s Party – even though poverty issues ranked low on the voters’ policy 
agendas (Karlsen 2009). 
 
7. PROCEDURAL POLITICISATION: EXPLORING THE DEGREE OF 
INVOLVEMENT FROM BELOW 
 
We can now turn to the procedural aspect of politicisation: to what extent was there 
involvement from ‘below’ in the party in the making of the 2005 party programmes and other 
                                                 
12
  Interviews with former Political Adviser, Egil Dahl, 17.2.06; and Political Adviser, Alf Rose Sørgaarden, 
30.11.05. 
13
  Party leader Lars Sponheim’s speech at the Liberal Party’s congress, Molde, 15–17.4.2005. 
14
  'Mer frihet. Mer ansvar. Et sosialliberalt reformprogram for stortingsperioden 2005–2009’.(‘More 
freedom. More responsibility. A social liberal reform program for 2005–2009’). Manifesto adopted by 
the Liberal Party’s congress, Molde, 15–17.4 2005, p 58–59 and 53–54. 
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policy documents? First, however, a few words are needed on the general process of 
manifesto development. 
 
All Norwegian parties appoint a manifesto committee, usually headed by a member of the 
party leadership. The committees write drafts that are sent to all local branches, which may 
submit proposals for changes. A revised draft is then circulated throughout the party 
organisation, before it is presented to the national party congress. Among the congress 
documents, the delegates (except for the Progress Party) also get a booklet setting out 
proposed changes from local branches and other party organs. During the congress, an 
‘editorial committee’ is responsible for further revisions and recommendations from the 
delegates, before the congress votes. In the description below, we follow the development of 
policies on pension and poverty through this process – before and during the congresses. 
 
7.1.  Party Debate before the Congresses 
 
Many positions from the 2001 manifestos were repeated in 2005, but that was not the case for 
poverty and pension. Poverty had become a debated issue after the 2001 election. It was 
generally assumed in Norwegian public debate and in the media that more money should be 
spent on fighting poverty (Bay and Stang 2009). Most parties – and especially Labour – had 
been accused of lacking policies on this issue and they aimed to update their manifestos in 
this area. In fact, Labour appointed an internal party committee on ‘social justice’ after losing 
the 2001 election. The idea of ‘welfare contracts’, which became a central part of the 
manifesto process, was originally launched by this committee.
15
 Moreover, between 2001 and 
2005, the Ministry of Social Affairs was governed first by the Conservatives and later by the 
Christian People’s Party. The policy-making of this Ministry became influential when these 
two parties subsequently presented their policies on poverty in their manifestos. Indeed, the 
Centre Party interviewee stated that the party had less need for policy development in this 
field, because so much work had been done by its previous Minister of Social Affairs (1997–
2000).
16
 That said, all parties included the poverty issue in their characteristically inclusive 
manifesto-making process prior to the 2005 elections. 
 
                                                 
15
  Interview with Political Adviser, Snorre Wikstrøm, 15.11.05. 
16
  Interview with Assistant General Secretary, Oddvar Igland, 9.12.05. 
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The parties also needed new policies on pensions, owing to the pension reform. However, 
most of the manifesto discussions took place after the Pension Commission presented its 
report in January 2004. This limited the freedom of the party organisation in the manifesto-
making process, although some parties coordinated the two processes by means of personnel 
overlap. A party could not easily revoke its position in the Commission, despite internal 
disagreements. The party leaderships aimed to provide negotiators with some flexibility in 
the upcoming deliberations in Parliament by limiting the level of detail in the manifesto. 
 
Pension reform was originally not an issue that aroused the interest of many party members. 
It was characterised as a ‘sport for the experienced’ in some of our interviews. Several parties 
found it necessary to educate their members, and the objective seemed to be to build the 
perception that reform was needed. For example, the Labour Party published a booklet on 
pension reform as part of the internal manifesto debate. The main topic discussed was how 




However, some groups within the parties got heavily involved in detailed aspects of the 
reform. Several parties’ women’s organisations were concerned with how the reform would 
affect women. A major issue was the choice between a lifetime accrual of pension rights and 
a 20-best-year rule. For example, the Christian People’s Party Women wanted to keep the 20-





The Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and individual LO members played central roles 
within the Labour Party and the Socialist Left Party. The partnership between the Labour 
Party and LO has traditionally been strong, and continued to be strong during the 2000s 
(Allern 2010). It was crucial for the Labour Party to avoid disagreement with LO in the 
pension debate. The LO Chair, Gerd-Liv Valla, was a member of Labour’s manifesto 
committee. According to newspaper reports, she and Labour Leader, Jens Stoltenberg, had 
                                                 
17
  Trygg og rettferdig pensjonsordning? Et debatthefte om Pensjonskommisjonens forslag og fremtidens 
pensjonssystem. (‘A robust and fair pension system? A discussion booklet on the proposals of the 
Pension Commision and the future pension system’). Labour Party, 2004.  
18
  Forslag nr 73, i ‘Endringsforslag til politisk program 2005–2009’. (Proposal no. 73, in ‘Amendments to 
the 2005–2009 manifesto’.). Document for the Christian People’s Party’s congress, Tønsberg, 21.–
24.4.2005. 
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numerous informal talks on the pension reform.
19 
The Leader of the Transport Workers’ 
Union was a key player in the pension debate in the Socialist Left Party. Among other things, 
he headed the editorial committee at a decisive National Council meeting.
20
 LO’s influence 
was nevertheless limited by conflicts between individual LO unions. Blue-collar unions 
disagreed with white-collar and public sector unions, and their representatives brought these 
disagreements into both the Labour Party and Socialist Left Party. 
 
Those who opposed pension reform entered the debate late, but resistance grew stronger in 
some parties. The protest was especially pronounced in the Socialist Left Party, where the 
anti-reform arguments entered into a broader ideological frame – the fight against the idea 
that ‘there is no alternative’.
21
 This led the Socialist Left Party’s National Council to abandon 
the party’s position on the Pension Commission in February 2005 – a decision that was 
confirmed by the party congress in April. 
 
7.2.  The Party Congresses 
 
Several issues relating to poverty and pensions were controversial during the congress, such 
as basic income as an anti-poverty measure or 20-best-year rule versus accrual of pension 
rights over a lifetime. In several cases, substantial changes were made at the congress. 
However, these changes often took place through compromises behind closed doors in the 
editorial committee – not through voting. For instance, the Liberal Party congress abandoned 
the manifesto committee’s position against mandatory occupational pensions – in line with 
the recommendation of the editorial committee. 
 
But even though the 2005 party manifestos were adopted after an inclusive and relatively 
democratic procedure, the final policy decisions were yet to be made, in particular regarding 
pension reform. In the Progress Party the manifesto described a universal flat-rate benefit 
model, but the Deputy Leader, Siv Jensen, later had to admit that ‘our primary model is 
politically stone dead, and we have to deal with the map everybody else is dealing with’.
22
 
The party had to take a stand on different concrete reform proposals. As the manifesto 
                                                 
19
  See, e.g., Aftenposten 12.3.2004, Dagsavisen 12.16.2004. 
20
  Klassekampen 14.2.2005. 
21
  Interview with Political Adviser, Tor Brostigen, 9.11.05. 
22
  Klassekampen 28.4.2005. 
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provided no guidelines, the party’s positions were in practice developed by the parliamentary 
party group. 
 
8.  SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
We will now summarise and discuss the findings above by referring to each of the indicators 
listed in Table 1 in turn. To what extent was the extra-parliamentary politics of pension 
reform and anti-poverty policy politicised during the early 2000s in Norway? 
 
Regarding substantive politicisation, in terms of policy differences vs. consensus and 
ideological positions, the policy documents and the interviews point to a broad, pragmatic 
agreement between the five ‘old’ parties on the need for an economically sustainable pension 
system, and thus cost-saving reform. However, this broad agreement – which brought about 
the Pension Commission – cracked when parties discussed the design of the new system. 
Disagreements both between and within parties were rooted in traditional party ideology, and 
significant policy differences were evident, as far as specific measures were concerned, 
between Left and Right. Parties on the Left were more concerned with redistribution, whereas 
the Conservatives emphasised that work should pay. The leadership of the Labour Party, for 
example, was pushed by party members, LO and the Socialist Left Party to propose a more 
redistributive system than the Pension Commission’s proposal, whereas the Conservatives 
consistently defended the connection between contributions and benefits. 
 
Moreover, both the two new parties on the left and right – the Socialist Left and the Progress 
Party – rejected the need for cost-savings. Finally, as far as attention paid to the policy issues 
was concernecd, we may conclude that all parties had significant presentations of pension 
policies in their manifestos and other policy documents adopted by the party congresses, but 
that the parliamentary settlement of May 2005 removed pensions from the agenda of the 
Storting election campaign later that year. 
 
As regards poverty, there was broad agreement among both old and new parties on the 
importance of incentives to seek employment. Even the Labour Party emphasised individual 
responsibility for poverty (‘workfare’) rather than traditional public expenditure to fight 
poverty – and the new Socialist Left party did not clearly dissent. However, we might have 
underestimated an old social democratic norm: that ‘everybody must contribute their share’ 
 22 
(Terum 1996). Thus, it could be argued that the workfare principle partly reflects a historical 
tradition in the Norwegian Labour Party. In any case, left–right polarisation was clearly 
present in party positions on universal vs. selective measures. The Right (the Conservatives 
and the Progress Party) was more supportive of non-selective measures than the parties on the 
Left. The Centre–Right parties (the Liberals and the Christian People’s Party) supported the 
government’s targeting policy, but were either somewhat uneasy about it or rather 
contradictory. Finally, we have seen that party programmes included comprehensive 
presentations of anti-poverty policies, and three of the seven parties studied here chose the 
‘fight against poverty’ as one of their key campaign issues before the 2005 general elections. 
 
In conclusion, the findings suggest that the substantial politicisation of pension policies is 
closer to the weak end of the weak–strong continuum. Two indicators clearly point in the 
direction of weakness: the uniform lack of campaigning and the centrist agreement among 
old parties on significant cuts in spending. This was, however, moderated by traditional 
conflicts regarding system architecture, and the fact that new parties developed their own 
policies. The findings for poverty policy are (more) mixed, as the results partly differed 
between the sub-fields of workfare and selective measures. A centrist agreement on 
individual responsibility points in the direction of weak politicisation, whereas traditional 
left-right conflicts in respect of selective vs. universal measures and a general lack of focus 
on budget cuts point in the opposite direction. Moreover, the poverty issue was included in 
both party manifestos and election campaigns. Hence, the degree of substantial politicisation 
seems stronger here than in the case of pension policies. 
 
Turning to procedural politicisation, we have shown that all parties used an inclusive 
procedure to adopt the party programme in general. Party organisations were involved in an 
extensive manifesto process (even if one may question the real influence of the activist level) 
in all cases. Drafts were discussed in local party branches, before the final decision was made 
by the representative party congress based on both the draft and proposals from the local 
level. Moreover, ‘internal’ interest groups, especially the trade unions in leftist parties, were 
strongly involved in the process. Taken together, at first glance, all four indicators testify to 
strong procedural politicisation. 
 
However, the parties in government relied on new poverty policies developed in office, and 
pension reform in particular exemplifies the limitations to the formal intra-party democracy 
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in times of major reforms. In practice, the party leadership and professional staff became 
predominant in the latter case. The timing of the manifesto process – after the Pension 
Commission – did not fit into the internal routines described above, and the technical nature 
of the issue did not encourage activity. Instead it created a need for expertise, favouring the 
civil service and independent experts. Hence, a closer scrutiny reveals that the pension policy 
was only moderately ‘procedurally politicised’. 
 
9.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Based on a detailed description of party policy positions and policy-making processes, we 
may conclude that pension reform was not strongly politicised – either substantially or 
procedurally – in the early 2000s in Norway. Major parties did advocate a moderate ‘middle 
position’ between the status quo and radical retrenchment, and the concern for cost-saving 
influenced the political debate and the repertoire of measures discussed in most parties. The 
party leadership and professional staff became predominant in the policy-making process 
outside Parliament. In this sense, the Norwegian core example of ‘retrenchment policies’ at 
the party (system) level was in line with the expectation based on the ‘the new politics 
thesis’. 
 
However, we have also seen that some substantial aspects indicate strong politicisation – like 
opposition from new parties (who do not or only modestly share a concern for future 
expenditure) and disagreement on the design of the pension system based on traditional 
ideological positions. Moreover, the case of anti-poverty policy was included to examine 
whether the implication of the ‘new politics thesis’ might apply to different fields of welfare 
policy. This sector matched the pattern of ‘weak politicisation’ at the party level to an even 
lesser extent, mainly due to traditional left-right policy disagreement and significant 
involvement from below within parties. If we also consider the fact that there is a tradition of 
cross-party compromises in Parliament in the case of major reforms (whether or not they are 
cuts-oriented) in Norway, the more elitist process observed during the pension reform process 
could be due more to the timing of the party congresses than to pressure for retrenchment. 
Whatever the case may be, the extra-parliamentary politics of welfare policies studied here 
seem neither strongly nor weakly politicised – rather, something in between. 
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What are the implications of these findings? Our synchronous data do not allow any analysis 
of how party positions or processes develop over time. We have looked into these issues on 
the basis of an in-depth study of the contemporary situation, using historical party policy 
differences and party organisational traditions only as indirect points of reference. From this 
angle, patterns that are not clearly consistent with the implications of the new politics thesis 
are revealed. Above all, we find that, despite indications of weak politicisation, significant 
and ideologically rooted policy differences on welfare issues still exist in the new millennium 
in Norway. Moreover, party activists and interest groups appear, to some extent, to be 
consulted on major welfare policy issues, and party organisations do still provide an arena for 
popular involvement. In sum, significant counter forces to the structural pressure for welfare 
(reform) policy convergence or homogeneity – described or implied by the new politics thesis 
– seem to exist between and within the parties themselves, even in a consensual state with a 
strong tradition for cross-party compromises. The study also reminds us that parties are 
complex collective political actors, not only constrained by the electoral market, but also by 
ideological legacies and formally democratic membership organisations outside the 
parliamentary sphere. Consequently, adopting less generous and different welfare policies 
probably involves some internal costs for party elites, in terms of resistance to the 
membership organisation if activists have a say. Moreover, our findings suggest that 
significant differences do exist between policy fields. 
 
An interesting avenue for future research could be to explore the extent to which there are 
significant differences between policy tools and fundamental policy goals within different 
areas, what Hall (1993) has conceptualised as ‘policy instruments vs. paradigms’. The 
pension reform debate illustrates that there might be agreement on general (yet quite specific) 
policy aims (on cost-saving reforms), but disagreement on the policy tools for reaching this 
objective (on the detailed system design), rooted in disagreement on more fundamental party 
goals (such as the degree of redistribution). Yet we also see that the distinctions between 
them are not necessarily watertight: some policy instruments, such as National Insurance, 
may acquire a symbolic value for political parties – and become goals in themselves.  
 
Of course we cannot generalise beyond Norway, but to what extent can we expect to find 
similar results in other countries? Norway is a major historical example of an extensive, 
universal welfare state. The extent of substantial politicisation of pension reform policies at 
the party level may not only be due to the existence of new Left and Right parties, but also to 
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the favourable state of the Norwegian oil economy. A more ‘centrist’ and ‘cartel-like’ 
pension reform may require a common perception of a more genuine crisis. The broad party 
consensus on workfare is, however, not peculiar to Norway. Several European countries, as 
well as the EU, focus on employment as a means of combating poverty and social exclusion. 
Bochel and Defty’s (2007a and b) study, for instance, points to a growing support for such 
measures among British MPs. 
 
Regarding procedural politicisation, Norwegian political institutions may be conducive to 
both strong and weak politicisation. For example, the fact that Norway has no constitutional 
provision for the early dissolution of Parliament makes the manifesto-making of parties 
(outside Parliament) more comprehensive and relevant than in other parties. This could partly 
explain the revealed degree of involvement from below as it nurtures the tradition of intra-
party democracy. On the other hand, the typical Norwegian – or Scandinavian – solution of 
establishing a reform-preparing committee including both government and opposition makes 
strong procedural politicisation less likely to exist here, though on a different basis than 
assumed by the ‘new politics thesis’. 
 
Whatever the case may be, future comparative studies of welfare policies and policy-making 
of parties should try to control for such institutional differences. This case study suggests that 
a possible avenue for studies of welfare policy at the level of government is not only to 
explore the impact of party system features and variation across policy fields, but also the 
possible significance of different types of party organisations involved in policy-making. 
Many parties might be willing to promote welfare reduction, although perhaps to different 
degrees, depending on both their original policy and their prioritisation of the goal of policy-
maximisation relative to access to office in cases of trade-offs. Moreover, strong intra-party 
democracy in terms of leadership accountability often means emphasis on core policies 
(Strøm and Müller 1999: 18). Thus, the enduring significance of partisanship revealed by 
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